



Tariff Strategy for the South African Port System

National Road Shows

June 2015

Overview

- Tariff Strategy in context
- Status Quo/ Problem Statement
- Approach to the tariff strategy
- Guiding Principles
- Asset Allocation
- Cargo Dues
- Marine Services
- Deviations from the Base Tariff
 - Cross-subsidies
 - Incentives
- Way forward and Implementation

Tariff Strategy in Context

- Tariff Methodology vs Tariff Strategy
 - Tariff Methodology
 - 2013 Interim methodology
 - 2014 Multi-year methodology (applicable to 2017/18)
 - Overall Revenue Requirement
 - Determines the “size of the cake”
 - Calculates the *average* tariff change
 - ROD is the implementing mechanism for the Tariff Strategy

Tariff Strategy in Context

- Tariff Methodology vs Tariff Strategy
 - Tariff Strategy
 - 2nd Round of consultation
 - Answers the question: Who pays for what? And why?
 - Determines “how the cake should be cut”
 - Sets the structure of the tariff book
 - Must be considered with the RR methodology in mind
 - “zero-sum game”
 - Formalisation of existing tariff trajectory
 - Aims to “clean up the tariff book” – status quo


Status Quo/Problem Statement

- Lack of a clear set of **principles** and rules to be applied in determining the individual tariffs for the various services and facilities, especially where deviating from a baseline tariff;
- Lack of clarity and **transparency** regarding all operating costs, expenses and revenues incurred or generated from a specific service, facility or land, as well as the value of the capital stock related to such services, facilities or land;
- Lack of **explanation** for differential tariffs for different commodities using the same handling classification;
- Lack of **information** detail with respect to services or facilities pricing and cost relationships, making it impossible to determine where and in which direction subsidisation takes place or if it does not;
- Lack of **information** on how the tariff structure promotes access to ports and efficient and effective management and operation of ports.

Status Quo/Problem Statement


- Very **high tariff levels for cargo dues** resulting from the migration from the old wharfage charge, which was calculated on an ad-valorem basis depending on the value of the cargo;
- Very **high differentials** in the levels of cargo dues for different cargo types and commodities with no clear motivation for the differences;
- Relatively **low tariff levels for maritime services**, which are based on an activity-based costing exercise conducted during the tariff reform of 2002 and that has since not been updated, resulting in the subsidisation of most services;
- Relatively **low and unevenly distributed levels of revenue** from the **real estate** business based on the asset value and benefits derived from being in the port system

Tariff Pricing Reform



Guiding Principles

The following principles were adhered to in creating a fair price structure.



Asset Allocation


Assets were allocated according to benefit.

Port User Asset Class	Lessees	Terminal Operator	Cargo Owners	Shipping Lines
Breakwaters	33% shared on a NBV basis		33%	33%
Channels, Fairways, basins			50%	50%
Quay walls, berths and jetties		50%		50%
All ship working vessels and aids to navigation				100%
Vessel repair infrastructure	40%	15%	15%	30%
All movable NPA assets, buildings and structures (not part of lease agreements) and unused land	50% shared on a NBV basis		25%	25%
Terminal land and staging areas		100%		
Non-Terminal Land including recreational and yachting	100%			
All common access infrastructure	66% Shared on a NBV basis		33%	
Overheads	50% shared on a NBV basis		25%	25%


±75%

Asset allocation

The new asset allocation results in the following changes in required revenue per user group.




Implementation



- The changes will be implemented over a period of **ten years**;
- The changes reflected above and below are based on the current tariff structure;
 - **Cargo owners:** real decrease in prices on an annual basis of **-5.2%**;
 - **Shipping lines:** real increase on an annual basis of **7.2%** and
 - **Lease revenue:** increase in real terms by **2.8%** annually.
- These are **indicative numbers only** and will change each year as the value of the asset base changes due to new capital and revaluation of assets.
- The review of this allocation will be published annually and reflected in the tariff determination.

Cargo Dues – Global Port Pricing Comparator Study

The GPPCS produced by the Ports Regulator for the past three years shows that cargo dues, collectively, are higher than global ports but, importantly, that container and automotive cargo dues are substantially higher than dry bulk cargo dues (which are slightly below the global average).



Cargo Dues – How the individual tariff is calculated

$$= \text{RAB} * \text{WACC} + \text{Operating Costs} + \text{Tax} + \text{Depreciation} \dots$$

Total
Required
Revenue (RR)

Asset Allocation

Cargo Owners

RR breakwaters and channels, vessel repair, NPA assets, common access infrastructure and overheads


RR allocated to cargo handling type according to vessel call ratio obtained from SAP

Total RR per cargo type/ forecasted number of units or tons per cargo type


= cargo due for each cargo type per ton or unit

Cargo Dues Cost Contribution

Individual cargo dues will be rationalised over ten years from a commodity based cargo due to a cargo handling type cargo due. This is reflected in the graph below. Cargo dues are allocated according to the number of vessel calls per cargo handling type.



Cargo Dues change in Required Revenue



Resulting Base Level Cargo Dues


The table below shows the cargo dues expected after 10 or more years, given the proposed tariff strategy. This is based on today's money, asset valuation, vessel call count and volumes. Ro-ro and containers are differentiated by import and export in line with government's beneficiation promotion agenda.

Base tariffs (R) in the proposed end state (based on 2013/14 data)

Dry bulk		6.53
Break bulk		31.03
Liquid bulk		15.21
RoRo	Import (Tons)	51.30
	Export (Tons)	25.65
Container (full)	Import (TEU)	651.53
	Export (TEU)	325.77

Marine Services – Global Port Pricing Comparator Study

The GPPCS produced by the Ports Regulator has shown three years in a row that charges to vessels for marine services and port dues are below the global average.



Marine Services

Costs for marine services will be collected according to the following rationale in the tariff strategy:

Tariff	Tariff Base/Design Methodology	Charge Frequency	Rationale
Port Dues	GRT per port/ 6 hour periods/linear fee per GRT	Per visit	Incentive for quicker turnaround times
Berthing and Running of lines	Consolidated tariff/Linear fee per GRT	Per visit	Simplification
Tugs	Flat fee per Tug, irrespective of Tug size/number of tugs determined by Harbour master	Per visit as determined by Harbour master	Incentive for latest technology vessels by moving away from fixed vessel size/tug ratio
Pilotage	Flat fee per service differentiated by port	Compulsory at every port/per visit	Simplification
VTS	GRT per port/linear fee differentiated by port	Every port where available	As per current tariff book
Light Dues	GRT per port/linear fee differentiated by port	First port of call	As per current tariff book

**Total
Required
Revenue (RR)**

= RAB*WACC + Operating Costs + Tax + Depreciation...

Asset Allocation

Shipping Lines

RR Tugs

RR Pilotage

RR VTS

RR Lights

**RR Berthing and
running of lines**

**RR Breakwater
and channels,
quay walls and
berths, vessel
repair, NPA
assets and
overheads
(Port Dues)**

RR Tugs/
total
movement
s adjusted
by tug port
factor

RR
pilotage/
total
movement
s adjusted
by pilotage
port factor

RR VTS/
total GRT
(all vessel
arrivals at
all ports in
one year)

RR Lights/
total GRT
(all first
arrivals
over one
year)

RR / Ship GRT
serviced

RR
infrastructure/
port dues
factor

=Flat rate
per tug
differentiat
ed by port

=Rate per
service
differentia
ted by port

=flat rate
per ton for
each port
visit


=flat rate
per ton for
each visit
to SA ports
system

=incremental
linear fee per
GRT

=Linear
incremental fee
per 6h stay and
GRT


Marine Services Cost allocation

The proportions of revenue recovered from various marine services will change under the tariff strategy in the following ways. Changes are a result of a more accurate reflection of the underlying cost of each service.




Marine Services Cost changes

The value of revenue recovered from various marine services will change under the tariff strategy in the following ways.




Rental



Deviations from the Base Tariff

The tariff strategy attempts to create a fair pricing system where tariffs are cost reflective and allocated according to benefit as far as possible. However, in special cases, it makes strategic sense to deviate from a cost reflective tariff. The deviations from the base tariff outline these special cases.



Criteria for allowing a cross-subsidy

Cross-subsidisation between user groups will be avoided as far as possible but will be allowed when it is in the **public interest** in accordance with the Directives to the National Ports Act (12 of 2005). Criteria have been identified under which subsidies will be granted. These are that the cross-subsidy:

- will meet economic growth and **developmental objectives**;
- aligns to **national policy objectives** with port pricing;
- is necessary for **equality in benefit**;
- will **minimise finance and volume risk**;
- will promote **efficient use of port facilities**;
- will **reduce congestion**;
- will promote the inclusion of **previously disadvantaged persons**;
- is aimed at reducing **carbon emissions**;
- If not granted, implies a drastic cost to the economy .

Industry will have an opportunity to apply to the NPA to receive a cross-subsidy.

Incentives

- Incentives in its simplest form can be seen as a **special case of discounts** that serves some commercial purpose.
- These discounts are therefore available to the NPA in order to gain some **commercial goal**, without requiring any cross-subsidy from other users. The objective of the discount is to be clearly **revenue neutral** at minimum i.e. It must pay for itself.


To Conclude: Strategic approach to cross-subsidies

Potential Cross-subsidies arising from historical pricing	Tariff strategy approach
<p>Cargo owners are subsidising other user groups such as vessel owners, and tenants.</p>	<p>A new asset allocation that results in an infrastructure cost reflective tariff proportional to the benefit each user group derives from the infrastructure or service provision. See sections 2 and 3.</p>
<p>Container and automotive cargo owners pay more than dry bulk cargo owners on a global comparator basis</p>	<p>Similarly, infrastructure is costed according to benefit derived from each cargo handling type – this is calculated by weighting total revenue required from cargo owners according to the number of vessel calls per cargo type and is then divided by total volume to get a per unit cost. See section 4.1.</p>
<p>It is still to be determined whether lessees are being subsidised (i.e. paying less than market value for their land) and whether some lessees are subsidising others (i.e. paying unequal or unfair tariffs).</p>	<p>The Regulator will start to actively monitor rental prices to ensure that two pieces of land with similar characteristics are not being charged radically different rentals. Furthermore, the Regulator will endeavour to determine the market value of port land as part of its asset valuation exercise. See section 4.3.</p>
<p>Port users of a particular port subsidising users in other ports, through a system wide tariff book approach.</p>	<p>System-wide pricing will remain in order to reduce the risk placed on any single port user; however, the tariff book is to be rebalanced and direct user charges in certain instances may be introduced. See section 2.3.</p>
<p>Port users subsidise fledgling port-related industries and other national policy initiatives/government objectives.</p>	<p>Discounting certain infrastructure for identified port users in order to achieve national objectives of economic growth and inclusion will remain. See section 5.</p>
<p>Use of port revenue/profits for non-port purposes.</p>	<p>This is outside the scope of the tariff strategy</p>
<p>Port users of the same category or user group paying lower tariffs than similar users through differentiated tariffs or discount structures.</p>	<p>All discount structures are to be removed from the tariff book. Tariff rationalisation will result in a gradual move towards consolidated tariffs that will include the removal of any discount structure currently in place. Certain built-in incentives and discounts will remain, mainly related to coastwise shipping and transshipment etc. See section 5.2 for further information.</p>

Way Forward

- Cargo dues to be amended in a similar way to previous tariff determinations for 2016/17.
- Convergence with annually published base rates to be accelerated beyond 2016/17 based on ongoing sensitivity analysis.
- Volume discounts to be removed within five years-or as situation allows
- Charges will be simulated during 2016/17. and implemented in 2017/18.
- Overall lease revenue annual increases sufficient for implementation of the strategy, however, more work *within* lease revenue required.
- Annual monitoring of amongst others, freight rates and volumes will allow the assessment of the impact of the strategy, including the effect of pass through and intermodal changes as well as the effect of vessel changes etc.

How your tariff change will be determined




Way Forward (cont)

- Phase 3

- Beneficiation Strategy to be concluded
- Review of the Tariff Methodology
- Valuation of the asset base

To include Stakeholder and government consultation process



Thank you